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ABSTRACT
We re-evaluate two experiments by Hizen and Saijo (1999a,b) to examine the
performance of bilateral trading and double auction institutions in GHG emissions
trading.  It is found that: (i) the efficiency of both institutions is quite high, regardless
of the disclosure or closure of contracted price and/or marginal abatement cost curve
information; (ii) marginal abatement costs are equalized over time in both institutions;
(iii) contracted prices roughly converge to the competitive price over time in a double
auction, but not quite so in bilateral trading.
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11. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol to the Climate Convention in December 1997 calls for Annex B
countries (that is, advanced countries and some countries that are in transition to market
economies) to reduce their average greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions over 2008-2012 to
about five percent below 1990 levels.  In order to implement this goal, it authorizes three
major mechanisms called the Kyoto mechanism. These are emissions trading, joint
implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism.  However, we must design the
details of these mechanisms as almost no details are given in the Protocol.  The
Conference of Parties at Buenos Aires in November 1998 following the Kyoto Conference
adopted a "Plan of Action," but this plan is a timetable regarding what should be argued
when, and hence no details of the protocol are given. The focus of this paper is to design
desirable institutions for GHG emissions trading through the use of experimental
economics.
Several candidates for emissions trading institutions have been proposed, such as
auctions, bilateral trading, and a mixture of these two.  However, no scientific bases have
been given to support them.  For example, as a supplemental institution to auctions, some
countries have proposed bilateral trading.  A typical response to this proposal by
economists, among others, is twofold: (i) it would be inefficient in the sense that some
dissatisfied traders could not be eliminated due to mismatching; and (ii) the revelation of
contracted prices would improve its efficiency.   These views are not based upon either
economic theory or empirical evidence.1  As a matter of fact, economic theory often
assumes that the market is a black box, and does not look into the details of trading
institutions.  Moreover, actual data on real economic activities cannot inform us how
                                                          
1 Feldman (1973) showed that allocations through bilateral trading can attain Pareto efficiency in a finite
number of steps.
2efficient the trading institution is.  For example, most of the trades in sulfur dioxide
allowance trading in the U.S.A. have been carried out through bilateral trading.  Some
have been undertaken through an annual auction designed by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), but it is hard to tell how efficient it is since no comparisons have
been made with other institutions.2
What would be the best way to evaluate several alternative institutions without
having data and with only limited experience?  A new method of understanding the
performance of alternatives has emerged in economics, namely, experimental economics.
For example, the EPA designed a new auction method for sulfur dioxide allowance
trading, hoping to realize relatively high allowance prices.  However, the actual prices
around the beginning of trading were significantly lower than those expected by
specialists.  Cason (1995) and Cason and Plott (1996) established laboratory experiments
where the trading institution was exactly the same as the EPA auction.  Participants
(called subjects) in the experiments were motivated by monetary rewards.  That is,
subjects who performed well in the laboratory EPA auction received greater
compensation than those who did not perform well.  What they found was striking.  The
experimental price data were well below the market price, which is exactly the opposite of
the EPA's expectation!
In survey articles, Muller and Mestelman (1998) and Godby, Mestelman and
Muller (1988) provide many new findings on emissions trading experiments.  Among
others, experimental economists have found that: (i) allowing banking permits over time
smoothes contracted prices across time periods, and (ii) a trader who has some market
power other than in the emissions trading market can influence the emissions trading
                                                          
2 Some evaluation of sulfur dioxide emissions trading has just started.  See, for example, Schmalensee et
al. (1998), Stavins (1998), and Joskow et al. (1998).
3market, and hence the introduction of the emissions market reduces the efficiency of the
whole economy.
In this paper, we re-examine two papers by Hizen and Saijo (1999a,b) who focused
on bilateral trading and double auction institutions with a special feature called the dual
role property.  In most previous experiments in emissions trading, each subject is assigned
to be a buyer or a seller, but not both.  That is, once a subject is a buyer, she cannot sell her
allowances even when the price is extremely high.  In these experiments, every subject can
be a buyer and a seller depending on the prices, so that a subject can play dual roles in
emissions trading.  The initiator of this dual role property in emissions trading is Bohm
(1997).  He reported bilateral trading experiments among four teams consisting of
experienced public officials or experts appointed by the Energy Ministries.  Each team
represented one of the four Nordic countries, and has some information on the marginal
abatement cost curves of all teams.  The asks and bids were exchanged by fax without
revealing this information to other teams.  It took four days to complete this experiment.
The resulting prices were very close to the competitive equilibrium price and the
efficiency of the allocation was 97%, which is surprisingly high.
Following Bohm's important experiment, Hizen and Saijo (1999a) designed a
bilateral trading experiment with two controls: (i) disclosure or closure of contracted
prices, and (ii) disclosure or closure of marginal abatement cost curves.  Thus, there are
four different treatments.  In this way, we can understand which case would be the most
appropriate or efficient way to reduce GHG emissions.  Furthermore, Hizen and Saijo
(1999b) conducted a double auction experiment with the same setting as the bilateral
trading experiment and then compared two institutions.  In the double auction, both
buyers and sellers can actively post and accept prices in a public manner.  In Hizen and
4Saijo (1999b), the control was the disclosure or closure of marginal abatement cost curves
since the contracted price information was revealed to all subjects in the double auction.
The first finding is that the efficiency of both institutions is very high, regardless of
information closure or disclosure.  That is, disclosure of contracted prices and/or marginal
abatement cost information does not improve efficiency.  Allocation efficiency was more
than 99% in 6 sessions, and 98% and 92% in the remaining sessions of the bilateral trading
experiment, and it was more than 99% in all five sessions in the double auction
experiment.  This finding contrasts strikingly with the widely accepted view on bilateral
trading.  Second, marginal abatement costs are equalized in almost all sessions in both
institutions.  Third, while the contracted prices did not converge to the competitive
equilibrium price in the bilateral trading experiment, they roughly converged to the price
in the double auction experiment.  This observation is different from Bohm's.  Fourth,
subjects who could exercise market power did not use that power in the bilateral trading
experiment, but subjects who had market power in the double auction experiment earned
greater profits than they could have earned at the competitive equilibrium price.  In each
session, we had six subjects who were supposed to represent Russia, Ukraine, U.S.A.,
Poland, EU, and Japan.  In our setting, only the U.S.A. had market power, and the subjects
who were assigned this role could reduce their quantity demanded in order to lower the
price.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 investigates bilateral trading and
section 3 examine a double auction.  In section 4, we discuss why efficiency is so high,
consider the implication of disclosure of contracted prices, and compare the two
institutions.  Section 5 discusses the future agenda.
52. Bilateral Trading
2.1 Experimental Design
The bilateral trading experiment has two controls: (i) disclosure or closure of
contracted prices, and (ii) disclosure or closure of marginal abatement cost curves.
Therefore, there are four treatments. Repeating the same treatment twice yields eight
sessions.  In what follows, "O" represents "disclosure" and "X" represents "closure".  For
example, "OX2" indicates session 2 in the price disclosure, marginal cost curve closure
treatment.
We recruited at least six students for each session by campus-wide advertisement
at Osaka University during October 1998.  These students were told that there would be
an opportunity to earn money in a research experiment.  None of them had prior
experience in a bilateral trading experiment.  It took approximately 160 minutes for each
session.  The mean payoff per subject was $31.25 ($1=115 yen).  The maximum payoff was
$66.09, and the minimum payoff was $17.39.
----------------------------------
Figure 1 is around here
----------------------------------
Let us describe an "OO" session.  Subjects were seated at desks in a relatively large
room and listened to a tape-recorded voice giving instructions.  In this part, each subject
received a sample graph (see Figure 1).  The upper half is a sample marginal abatement
cost curve.  Each subject was told that the initial position is at 0.3  If the subject moves to
the right, she buys the allowance and earns benefits, and if she moves to the left, she sells
the allowance and obtains a profit.  All possible situations were depicted in the lower half
                                                          
3 We implicitly presume that position 0 is the position where each country attains the goal required by
the Kyoto Protocol.  In other words, the experimental setting asks what kind of trading should be done in
order to achieve that goal.  That is, we did not address the non-compliance issue.
6of Figure 1.  After receiving instructions on how to transact with other subjects, all
subjects took an examination to check their understanding of the instructions.  The best six
subjects continued the experiment, and the rest were asked to leave the room with $13.
Then each subject was assigned an identification number from 1 to 6 and, at the same time,
each subject received her own marginal abatement cost curve.  In the "OO" session, each
subject received Figure 2 with all six abatement cost curves, and had fifteen minutes to
examine it.4  Then bilateral trading started.  Since every subject had a tag with an
identification number, subjects could identify other subjects' marginal abatement cost
curves.  Each subject could move around the room freely to find a subject with whom to
transact.  During negotiations, subjects were not allowed to talk.  Only numbers (price and
quantity), and "yes" and "no" symbols on their negotiation sheets, were exchanged in
order to avoid information leakage.  Once a pair reached agreement, they reported the
price and quantity to an experimenter, who announced these numbers on a blackboard
(i.e., contracted price disclosure).  The maximum time for negotiations was 60 minutes,
and subjects could end their negotiations early if all subjects agreed to it.  The full 60
minutes was used in all sessions except "XO2."
----------------------------------
Figure 2 is around here
----------------------------------
During the experiment, we did not use any country names or the term "emissions
trading."   That is, subjects faced a situation where trading of an abstract commodity was
conducted with an abstract price.
2.2 Experimental Results
Economists care about the market (or competitive) equilibrium price where the
demand and supply curves intersect since the sum of benefit and profit of all subjects is
                                                          
4 Since information on the marginal abatement cost curves around 2010 is hard to obtain, we draw these
7maximized at this price.  Keeping this in mind, we define the efficiency of bilateral trading
as follows:
Sum of benefit and profit of each subject
 Sum of benefit and profit at market equilibrium
That is, the maximum efficiency should be one.  In our design, the competitive
equilibrium price ranges from 118 to 120 so we regard 119, which is the midpoint between
118 and 120, as the competitive equilibrium price.  At this price, the total amount of
benefit and profit (that is, the maximum amount that these six subjects can enjoy) is 6990.
In Table 1, the top row indicates the name of the sessions, the left column shows the I.D.
numbers of subjects, and the numbers in parentheses are their benefits or profits at the
competitive equilibrium price.  In each cell, the upper figure is the actual benefit or profit
that the subject earned, and the lower figure is the efficiency of this subject.  For example,
the 0.732 figure for subject 1 in the "OO2" session is the ratio between 1870 and 2555,
which we call individual efficiency.
    
OO1 OO2 OX1 OX2 XO1 XO2 XX1 XX2
Subject No.
1(2555) 1420 1870 960 1710 1510 1100 1460 1600
(Russia) 0.556 0.732 0.376 0.669 0.591 0.431 0.571 0.626
2(1290) 1140 914 360 1665 1320 940 1536 2370
(Ukraine) 0.884 0.709 0.279 1.291 1.023 0.729 1.191 1.837
3(610) 685 683 2060 372 1846 615 583 550
(U.S.A.) 1.123 1.120 3.377 0.610 3.026 1.008 0.956 0.902
4(390) 520 570 850 530 500 555 910 500
(Poland) 1.333 1.462 2.179 1.359 1.282 1.423 2.333 1.282
5(620) 800 1105 1300 755 -150 1080 81 150
(EU) 1.290 1.782 2.097 1.218 -0.242 1.742 0.131 0.242
6(1525) 2425 1800 1450 1844 1400 2700 2390 1800
(Japan) 1.590 1.180 0.951 1.209 0.918 1.770 1.567 1.180
Sum(6990) 6990 6942 6980 6876 6426 6990 6960 6970
1 0.993 0.999 0.984 0.919 1 0.996 0.997
Table 1. Efficiency of Bilateral Trading
                                                                                                                                                                                
curves based upon some information provided by Dr. Kawashima.
8As Table 1 shows, the efficiency of each session is quite high, except for "XO1."
The reason for the low efficiency level in this session is that subject 5 traded with other
subjects even though she suffered a loss.  Individual efficiencies are quite different even
for the same subject number.  Statistical tests show that Russia consistently earned a much
lower profit than that of the competitive equilibrium and Poland earned a greater profit
than that of the competitive equilibrium.  The efficiency of the other countries is close to
one.  As we discuss later, the only country that had some market power was the U.S.A.
----------------------------------
Figure 3 is around here
----------------------------------
Figure 3 shows efficiency changes over time.  After sixteen minutes, the efficiency
of allocation in all sessions except for session "XX2," was greater than 80%, and it was
more than 90% in 6 sessions of 8 after 25 minutes.  Efficiency usually is monotonically
increasing, but in session "OX2" efficiency moved up and down.  This was due to the fact
that one subject bought allowances at a loss, but sold it at a relatively high price.
Summarizing these findings, we have:
Observation 1. (i) The efficiency of bilateral trading is almost one, regardless of closure or
disclosure of price and marginal abatement cost information.
(ii) Russia's efficiency is low, Poland's efficiency is high, and the efficiency of the other countries is
close to one.
(iii) The efficiency of allocation in 6 sessions of 8 was more than 90% after 25 minutes.
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show contracted prices and quantities, together with asks and
bids, over time.  The gray horizontal line in each small graph shows the competitive
equilibrium price range of 118-120.  The left-hand side number of a square is the seller's
9subject number, the right-hand side number is the buyer's subject number, and the
number under the square is the contracted quantity.  If the variance of the last three
contracted prices is significantly smaller than the variance of the first three prices, then we
say that the contracted price sequence converges.  We find convergence of contracted
prices in five of eight sessions, but no information disclosure effect is observed.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 are around here
------------------------------------------------------------------
Observation 2. (i) Contracted average prices in session "XX" (closure of prices and closure of
marginal abatement cost curves) roughly equal the competitive equilibrium price, but the variances
of prices in sessions XX1 and XX2 are larger than those of the rest.
(ii) Average prices cannot be said to equal the competitive equilibrium price in sessions other than
the "XX" sessions.
(iii) The average price of the last three contracts is not equal to the competitive equilibrium price in
every session.
(iv) The convergence of contracted prices is found in five of eight sessions, but no information
disclosure effect on convergence is observed.
By the nature of bilateral trading, the price contracted by a pair of subjects is determined
by negotiation.  Even though several other contracted prices have already been
announced, a pair of subjects cannot reach an agreement if either of them rejects these
prices.  For this reason, the competitive equilibrium price cannot play the role of the
standard of trade.
The effect of disclosure of contracted prices can be calculated by comparing the
"OO" and "XO" sessions, and the "OX" and "XX" sessions.  Since the variances of
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contracted prices in sessions "OX1" and "OX2" cannot be said to be the same, we omitted
these sessions from the comparison.  Under this constraint, we compare the "OO" sessions
with the "XO" sessions.  No differences are observed among the variances of these sessions.
For the same reason mentioned in the above paragraph, we compare the "XO"
sessions with the "XX" sessions to measure the effect of disclosure of marginal abatement
cost curve information.  We find that the variance of contracted prices in the "XO" sessions
is smaller than in the "XX" sessions.   Summarizing these facts, we have:
Observation 3. (i) Assuming that each subject knows other subjects' marginal abatement cost
curves well, the disclosure of contracted prices does not have any impact on the variance of
contracted prices.
(ii) Under the closure of contracted prices, the disclosure of marginal abatement cost curves
reduces the variance of contracted prices.
Behind efficiency, we can see how marginal abatement costs changed over time.
Due to the step-function nature of our marginal abatement cost curve, we must be careful
when evaluating marginal costs.  For example, the marginal abatement cost of Russia in
session "OO1" was 90 after 25 minutes.  Checking the raw data, we find that Russia sold
exactly 55 units of emissions allowance in 25 minutes.  Therefore, if the subject wanted to
sell one more unit, its marginal abatement cost would have been 120 (see Figure 2).
Taking account of this fact, we have:
Observation 4. Except for the EU subject in session "XO1," the marginal abatement costs of all
subjects approach the competitive equilibrium price, but the contracted prices do not.
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In order to understand how much market power a country has, we need an
aggregate excess demand curve of all subjects regarding marginal abatement cost curves
as the excess demand curves for emissions allowances.  After careful examination, we find
that the only country that has market power in our design is the U.S.A.  Table 1 shows
that the benefits of the U.S.A. were more than three times the benefit at the competitive
equilibrium in two sessions of eight.  A statistical test shows that the U.S.A. did not
exercise market power in any session.  Most probably, the subjects could not exploit the
marginal abatement cost curve information to use such market power.
3. Double Auction
3.1 Experimental Design
            In a double auction, all proposals, including contracted prices and quantities, are
disclosed.  Therefore, our double auction experiment has only one control, namely
disclosure or closure of marginal abatement cost curves.  We had three disclosure sessions
and two closure sessions, and hence five sessions in total.  Following the previous section,
we denote these sessions by "O3", "X2", and so on.  The only difference between our
double auction and bilateral trading is in the trading method.  In the double auction, an
auctioneer calls on a subject who raises her hand the earliest.  Then the subject provides
her I.D. number, sell or buy, the quantity and the price per unit.  For example, the subject
says, "Subject five sells ten units at one hundred dollars per unit."  The auctioneer projects
the proposal on an OHP screen.  After the proposal, a subject who raises her hand the
earliest can trade with the proposer.  The accepted quantity is smaller than or equal to the
proposed quantity. We impose the "improvement rule" on proposals in our double auction,
that is, asks (bids) must be successively lower (higher).
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            In our double auction experiment, the mean payoff per subject was $28.20, the
maximum payoff was $44.70, and the minimum payoff was $17.39.  The maximum time
for an auction was 60 minutes, and subjects could end the auction early if all subjects
agreed to it.  The full 60 minutes was used in three of five sessions.
3.2 Experimental Results
            As Table 2 shows, the efficiency of each session is quite high.  Statistical tests show
that Poland consistently earned a lower profit than that of the competitive equilibrium
and the U.S.A. earned a greater profit than that of the competitive equilibrium.  The
efficiency of the other countries is close to one.
O1 O2 O3 X1 X2
Subject No.
1 (2555) 2410 2410 1981 2260 2865
(Russia) 0.943 0.943 0.775 0.885 1.121
2 (1290) 1320 1320 520 1770 1120
(Ukraine) 1.023 1.023 0.403 1.372 0.868
3 (610) 850 865 1144 681 1270
(U.S.A.) 1.393 1.418 1.875 1.116 2.082
4 (390) 200 350 230 209 355
(Poland) 0.513 0.897 0.590 0.536 0.910
5 (620) 750 500 1380 700 0
(EU) 1.210 0.806 2.226 1.129 0.000
6 (1525) 1430 1515 1695 1350 1360
(Japan) 0.938 0.993 1.111 0.885 0.892
Sum (6990) 6960 6960 6950 6970 6970
0.996 0.996 0.994 0.997 0.997
Table 2. Efficiency of the Double Auction
Figure 5 shows efficiency changes over time.  After seventeen minutes, the
efficiency of allocation in all sessions except for session "X2," was greater than 70%, and
was more than 90% in all sessions after 44 minutes.  Efficiency usually is monotonically
increasing, but in sessions "X1" and "X2" efficiency reached 100% once and then fell
slightly.  For example, in session "X2," one subject sold allowances at a loss, expecting that
13
she would buy them at a lower price later but could not.  Such a loss was not observed
when the marginal abatement cost information was disclosed.
----------------------------------
Figure 5 is around here
----------------------------------
Observation 5. (i) The efficiency of the double auction is almost one, regardless of closure or
disclosure of marginal abatement cost information.
(ii) Poland's efficiency is low, the U.S.A.s efficiency is high, and the efficiency of the other
countries is close to one.
(iii) The efficiency of allocation in all sessions is more than 90% after 44 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 6 is around here
------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 6 shows contracted prices and quantities, together with asks and bids, over
time.  We examine the average price of all contracts and that of the last three contracts to
see where the prices converge.  We have:
Observation 6. (i) Regardless of closure or disclosure of marginal abatement cost information,
convergence of prices is observed.
(ii) Average prices of all contracts in sessions "O1", "O2" and "X1" equal the competitive
equilibrium price.
(iii) Average prices of the last three contracts in sessions "O1", "X1" and "X2" equal the
competitive equilibrium price.
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We examine the effect of disclosure of marginal abatement cost curves.  The
variances of contracted prices in the "O" sessions are smaller than those in the "X" sessions.
In competitive equilibrium, Russia, Ukraine and Poland are sellers while the U.S.A., EU
and Japan are buyers.  In the "O" sessions, Russia, Ukraine and Poland only sold the
allowances, while the U.S.A., EU and Japan only bought them.  The numbers of trade in
sessions "O1", "O2" and "O3" were 9,  8 and 7, respectively, while those in sessions "X1"
and "X2" were 11 and 12, respectively.
Observation 7. The disclosure of marginal abatement cost curves:
(i) reduces the variance of contracted prices;
(ii) makes Russia, Ukraine and Poland only sell, and the U.S.A., EU and Japan only buy;
(iii) reduces the number of trades.
Behind efficiency, we can see how marginal abatement costs changed over time.
Observation 8. Marginal abatement costs of all subjects approach the competitive equilibrium
price.
In our double auction experiment, marginal abatement costs converged less rapidly than
in bilateral trading.  We conjecture that this arises because, in the double auction, at most
one pair can trade at the same time while at most three pairs can do so in bilateral trading.
4. Discussions and Comparisons
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Extremely high efficiency in Observations 1 and 5 is partly due to the fact that each
country can buy and sell the allowance depending on the price, which we call the dual role
property of a trader.  We consider that the property is essential in emissions trading.
Consider the following simple demand and supply curves with two suppliers and two
buyers.  Each supplier has just one unit of a good.  On the other hand, each buyer wants to
buy just one unit of the good.  Apparently the competitive equilibrium price must be
between 4 and 7, and the social surplus becomes 8.  If buyers can only buy and sellers can
only sell, a mismatch can easily occur.  Consider a pair in which the buyer's value is 10
and the seller's cost is 7. If they trade with each other, the surplus is 3. Consider another
pair in which the buyer's value is 4 and the seller's cost is 2.  The surplus of this pair is 2
and hence the sum of the surplus is 5, which is less than 8.  After these trades, no mutually
beneficial trade will occur. Now consider the case in which everyone can buy and sell.
After these trades, the buyer whose value is 4 has one unit of the good and hence can sell
it.  Since the seller whose cost is 7 does not have any good, she can buy it.  If this pair
trades with each other, they can enjoy 3 units of surplus, so that the total surplus becomes
8.  Actually, starting from any trading pair, we can find a path that leads to a Pareto
efficient allocation.
----------------------------------
Figure 7 is around here
----------------------------------
In our bilateral trading experiment, every session had at least one subject who was
a buyer and a seller in the same session.  Apparently, this dual role property helped to
improve the efficiency of allocation in all sessions.  On the other hand, in the double
auction experiment, no sessions with marginal abatement cost curve disclosure had such a
subject, but every session with its closure had at least one such subject.  In the double
16
auction with the marginal abatement cost curve disclosure, every subject understood who
should be a buyer and a seller from Figure 2, and hence no dual role trader was generated
during the auction.  However, the dual role property was important to improve efficiency
in the double auction under the marginal abatement cost closure.
Most of the previous emissions trading experiments in the literature has not taken
account of the dual role property.  For example, Cason and Gangadharan (1998) reported
that efficiencies are quite low in an experiment where subjects publicly post proposed
terms of trade through an Electronic Bulletin Board that captures the Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market (RECLAIM) in the Los Angeles area.  Cason and Gangadharan partly
attribute this low efficiency to some transaction costs due to the Bulletin Board system.
We would conjecture that the dual role property may drastically improve its efficiency.
In both bilateral trading and double auction experiments, the variances of
weighted contracted prices around the beginning of transactions are quite large, but
toward the end the variances of weighted contracted prices in double auction sessions are
sufficiently smaller than those in bilateral trading sessions.  Furthermore, we find that
contracted prices around the end of transactions in double auction sessions are much
closer to the competitive equilibrium price than those in bilateral trading sessions.  In
these respects, the double auction is better than bilateral trading.
As for the effect of marginal abatement cost disclosure, the variances of weighted
contracted prices with information disclosure are smaller than those with information
closure in double auction sessions.  In bilateral trading, the former are smaller than the
latter if the contracted prices are not disclosed.  The disclosure of contracted price
information in bilateral trading does not affect the variances of the contracted prices if the
abatement cost information is revealed.  Since the number of sessions in our experiments
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is limited, we cannot conclude some definite effects.  However, it seems that the
information of marginal abatement costs of other countries may reduce some variances of
contracted prices in both bilateral trading and the double auction.
The experiments did not show any significant effects of disclosure of contracted
prices on the variance in bilateral trading.  This does not necessarily imply that the closure
of contracted prices is better than disclosure.  First, if the disclosure or closure of
contracted prices does not matter, there is no reason why they should be hidden.
Although the experimental results did not show any significant difference, something
unexpected might occur in future emissions trading. For this safety reason, transactions
should be undertaken in public.  Second, the transaction of GHG emissions allowances is
not a truly private economic activity.  As it would affect absolutely everyone, it should be
done in public.
            As Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 6 show, the number of asks and bids in bilateral trading is
larger than the number in the double auction.  The average number in bilateral trading is
about four times as large as that in the double auction.  If we think that this number is an
indicator of economic transaction costs, we might conclude that the double auction is
better than bilateral trading.  However, this statement belies the fact that a large volume of
asks and bids can be transmitted through a computer network such as the internet at only
a nominal cost.
Subjects who played the U.S.A. role in the double auction experiment obtained a
greater profit than they could have earned at the competitive equilibrium price.  This does
not necessarily indicate that the subjects exercised market power.  We conjecture that
subjects in the double auction may have much broader information on the market than the
subjects in bilateral trading since bids and asks are public in the double auction.  This fact
18
might trigger the U.S.A. subjects to use their market power. Clearly, further studies are
needed to understand this market power issue.
5. Concluding Remarks
In these experiments, it was found that, first, the efficiency of both bilateral trading
and double auction is quite high.  This high efficiency may come from the dual role
property of traders.  Second, marginal abatement costs are equalized over time in both
trading institutions.  Third, contracted prices did not converge to the competitive price
over time in bilateral trading, but they converged relatively to the competitive price in the
double auction.  Fourth, subjects who had market power did not use it in bilateral trading,
but subjects who had market power in the double auction experiment obtained greater
profits than at the competitive price.
If a policy goal is only to achieve cost effectiveness, either institution can attain
such a goal.  On the other hand, if a policy maker cares about "equity," in the sense that
the same unit of allowance must be traded with the same price, the double auction is
better than bilateral trading.  Furthermore, if one thinks that some transaction costs
increase as the number of asks and bids increases, the double auction is better than
bilateral trading.
Our comparison of two institutions is a prelude to several more experiments that
aim at designing the entire emissions trading institutions.  In order to provide a solid basis
for such a design, we plan to conduct the following: (1) Banking experiment, (2) Non-
compliance experiment, (3) Liability experiment and (4) Market power experiment.
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Figure 3. Efficiency over Time in Bilateral Trading
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Figure 5. Efficciency over Time in the Double Auction.
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